THE WILLIAM DUNGEY CASE

In 1855, Abraham Lincoln represented William Dungey in a slander case against Joseph Spencer, who had publicly claimed Dungey was a “negro.” Under Illinois law at the time, such a classification carried serious legal consequences. Lincoln’s successful suit protected Dungey’s reputation and rights, and the case illustrates how legal status and civil rights were governed by both law and public perception.  

Because such a classification carried severe legal consequences, the court was required to determine Dungey’s true legal status before jurisdiction could attach. The case illustrates that false status attribution constituted actionable defamation and that jurisdiction depends upon lawful classification. 

Early American courts often recognized that slave laws applied only to specific classes, typically described as:

• “Negroes,”
• “Mulattoes,” and
• "Persons descended from African slaves".
   

In the 18th–19th century, calling a man or woman a "negro" was actionable slander, because it:

• Attacked legal status
• Implied loss of liberty
• Implied loss of civil rights
• Exposed the person to unlawful restraint or seizure

At that time “Negro” was not just a descriptor, it was (and still is to this present day as "Black") under a legal status classification. It implied subjection to slave statutes. Thus, falsely calling a free man a “Negro” amounted to:

• A claim of civil death
• A claim of property status
• A claim of inferior legal standing

Courts recognized this as slander per se — meaning damage was presumed.

Under the 1853 Illinois “Black Laws,” a man publicly classified as “Negro” could lose:

• Marriage rights
• Property rights
• Settled residency rights

This was more than insult — legal status and civil rights were at stake

To decide the slander claim, the court necessarily had to answer:

Was William Dungey, in law, a negro subject to slave statutes — or a free Moor outside those statutes?

That inquiry required determining legal status first, before any lawful jurisdiction or liability could attach. This is exactly why the case is cited in status-before-jurisdiction discussions.  

The case demonstrates that:

• Status is judicially cognizable
• False status attribution is actionable
• Courts recognized that misclassification causes legal harm
• A person’s freedom and standing are protected interests
   

In other words, the law itself acknowledged that calling a free Moor a Negro (Slave) was a grave legal violation.

Does a court have jurisdiction to restrain or adjudicate a man as a “Negro” under slave law when he asserts and demonstrates status as a free Moor?

This is a status-before-jurisdiction question, not a racial one. 

Dungey’s position, as reflected in historical summaries and later jurisprudential references, rested on four core assertions:

1. He was a free Moor, not a “negro” within the meaning of slave statutes
2. Slave laws did not apply to free Moors
3. Freedom is presumed at common law
4. Bondage must be proven by the party asserting it
    

Absent lawful proof, restraint was unlawful.

A court must first determine who the person is in law before applying statutes.

If the statute does not reach the person’s status:

• The court has no jurisdiction
• Any action taken is void
• This principle was later clearly articulated in Elliot v. Peirsol, 26 U.S. 328 (1828):
   "If a court acts without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void."

Under Anglo-American common law:

• Liberty is the default condition
• Slavery is an exception that must be strictly proven
   

Failure to prove lawful enslavement defeats jurisdiction.

Applying a statute to someone outside its class is a jurisdictional defect.

• Classification determines the applicable body of law
• Wrong law constitutes no authority

While the William Dungey case is not a single famous published appellate opinion, it represents a recognized category of freedom litigation in which:

• Courts acknowledged that free Moors were not automatically subject to slave codes
• Detention based solely on skin complexion or assumption was unlawful
• Status controlled the court’s power

Its importance is doctrinal, not sensational.

• “Negro” (and the modern term "Black / African-American") was and still is a legal classification, not a biological fact
• Courts required proof of status, not presumption
• Jurisdiction fails when status is misapplied
• Identity in law controls authority

The same doctrine appears today in different language:

• Standing
• Capacity
• Jurisdictional facts, and
• Violations under color-of-law

The William Dungey case illustrates the status-before-jurisdiction doctrine in early American law: where a person’s legal status does not fall within the class governed by a statute, a court lacks jurisdiction, and any restraint or judgment is void ab initio.

Dungey was not proven to be a “Negro” under Illinois law.  

The case is used to teach that:

• Status must be established on the record
• Presumptions create jurisdictional fraud
• Lawful authority depends on lawful classification
   

It is studied not as folklore, but as a jurisdictional lesson grounded in common law. Dungey’s position was that free Moors did not fall into those categories. 

The same position applies today to Moorish-Americans.